Friday, 30 December 2011

starbucks supply chain strategy

From bean to cup: How Starbucks transformed its supply chain

With operational costs rising and sales declining, the global coffee purveyor implemented a three-step plan to improve supply chain performance, cut costs, and prepare for the future.
It takes a well-run supply chain to ensure that a barista pours a good cup of Starbucks coffee. That's because the journey from bean to cup is a complicated one. Coffee and other merchandise must be sourced from around the globe and then successfully delivered to the Starbucks Corporation's 16,700 retail stores, which serve some 50 million customers in 51 countries each week.
But in 2008, Starbucks wasn't sure that its supply chain was meeting that goal. One clue that things were not quite right: the company's operational costs were rising even though sales were cooling. Between October 2007 and October 2008, for example, supply chain expenses in the United States rose from US $750 million to more than US $825 million, yet sales for U.S. stores that had been open for at least one year dropped by 10 percent during that same period.
In part, Starbucks was a victim of its own success. Because the company was opening stores around the world at a rapid pace, the supply chain organization had to focus on keeping up with that expansion. "We had been growing so fast that we had not done a good enough job of getting the [supply chain] fundamentals in place," says Peter D. Gibbons, executive vice president of global supply chain operations. As a result, he says, "the costs of running the supply chain—the operating expenses—were rising very steeply."
To hold those expenses in check and achieve a balance between cost and performance, Starbucks would have to make significant changes to its operations. Here is a look at the steps Gibbons and his colleagues took and the results they achieved.
A plan for reorganization
Starbucks' supply chain transformation had support from the very top. In 2008, Chairman, President, and Chief Executive Officer Howard Schultz tapped Gibbons, who was then senior vice president of global manufacturing operations, to run the company's supply chain. This was a familiar role for Gibbons; prior to joining Starbucks in 2007, he had been executive vice president of supply chain for The Glidden Co., a subsidiary of ICI Americas Inc.
The first two things Gibbons did in his new position were assess how well the supply chain was serving stores, and find out where costs were coming from. He soon learned that less than half of store deliveries were arriving on time. "My quick diagnosis was ... that we were not spending enough attention on how good we were at delivering service to stores," he recalls. Following that assessment, Gibbons began visiting Starbucks' retail stores to see the situation for himself and get input from employees. "The visits were made to confirm that our supply chain could improve significantly," he explains. "The best people to judge the need for change were those at the customer-facing part of our business."
A cost analysis revealed excessive outlays for outsourcing; 65 to 70 percent of Starbucks' supply chain operating expenses were tied to outsourcing agreements for transportation, third-party logistics, and contract manufacturing. "Outsourcing had been used to allow the supply chain to expand rapidly to keep up with store openings, but outsourcing had also led to significant cost inflation," Gibbons observes.
In response to those findings, Gibbons and his leadership team devised a three-step supply chain transformation plan and presented it to Starbucks' board of directors. Under that plan, the company would first reorganize its supply chain organization, simplifying its structure and more clearly defining functional roles. Next, Starbucks would focus on reducing the cost to serve its stores while improving its day-to-day supply chain execution. Once these supply chain fundamentals were firmly under control, the company could then lay the foundation for improved supply chain capability for the future.
Simplifying the complex
The first step of the transformation plan, reorganizing Starbucks' supply chain organization, got under way in late 2008. According to Gibbons, that involved taking a complex structure and simplifying it so that every job fell into one of the four basic supply chain functions: plan, source, make, and deliver. For instance, anybody involved in planning—be it production planning, replenishment, or new product launches—was placed in the planning group. Sourcing activities were grouped into two areas: coffee and "non-coffee" procurement. (Starbucks spends US $600 million on coffee each year. Purchases of other items, such as dairy products, baked goods, store furniture, and paper goods, total US $2.5 billion annually.) All manufacturing, whether done in-house or by contract manufacturers, was assigned to the "make" functional unit. And finally, all personnel working in transportation, distribution, and customer service were assigned to the "deliver" group.
After the supply chain functions were reorganized, the various departments turned their attention to the second objective of the supply chain transformation: reducing costs and improving efficiencies. As part of that effort, the sourcing group worked on identifying the cost drivers that were pushing up prices. "We went out to understand the contracts we had, the prices we were paying, and the shipping costs, and we began breaking items down by ingredient rather than just purchase price," Gibbons says. "We built more effective 'should cost' models, including benchmarking ingredients and processes, which showed that we could negotiate better prices."
Meanwhile, the manufacturing group developed a more efficient model for delivering coffee beans to its processing plants, with the goal of manufacturing in the region where the product is sold. Starbucks already owned three coffee plants in the United States, in Kent, Washington; Minden, Nevada; and York, Pennsylvania. In 2009, the company added a fourth U.S. plant, in Columbia, South Carolina. The benefits of that approach were quickly apparent; regionalizing its coffee production allowed Starbucks to reduce its transportation costs and lead times, says Gibbons. Moreover, once the new facility was up and running, all of the U.S. coffee plants were able to switch from seven-day operations to five days.
In addition to the four coffee facilities it owns in the United States, Starbucks also operates a coffee plant in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, and a processing plant for its Tazo Tea subsidiary in Portland, Oregon. The company also relies on 24 co-manufacturers, most of them in Europe, Asia, Latin America, and Canada.
Even though it spread production across a wide territory, transportation, distribution, and logistics made up the bulk of Starbucks' operating expenses because the company ships so many different products around the world. Getting that under control presented a daunting challenge for the supply chain group. "Whether coffee from Africa or merchandise from China, [our task was to integrate] that together into one global logistics system, the combined physical movement of all incoming and outgoing goods," says Gibbons. "It's a big deal because there's so much spend there, and so much of our service depends on that. ... With 70,000 to 80,000 deliveries per week plus all the inbound shipments from around the world, we want to manage these logistics in one system."
One world, one logistics system
The creation of a single, global logistics system was important for Starbucks because of its far-flung supply chain. The company generally brings coffee beans from Latin America, Africa, and Asia to the United States and Europe in ocean containers. From the port of entry, the "green" (unroasted) beans are trucked to six storage sites, either at a roasting plant or nearby. After the beans are roasted and packaged, the finished product is trucked to regional distribution centers, which range from 200,000 to 300,000 square feet in size. Starbucks runs five regional distribution centers (DCs) in the United States; two are company-owned and the other three are operated by third-party logistics companies (3PLs). It also has two distribution centers in Europe and two in Asia, all of which are managed by 3PLs. Coffee, however, is only one of many products held at these warehouses. They also handle other items required by Starbucks' retail outlets—everything from furniture to cappuccino mix.
Depending on their location, the stores are supplied by either the large, regional DCs or by smaller warehouses called central distribution centers (CDCs). Starbucks uses 33 such CDCs in the United States, seven in the Asia/Pacific region, five in Canada, and three in Europe; currently, all but one are operated by third-party logistics companies. The CDCs carry dairy products, baked goods, and paper items like cups and napkins. They combine the coffee with these other items to make frequent deliveries via dedicated truck fleets to Starbucks' own retail stores and to retail outlets that sell Starbucks-branded products.
Because delivery costs and execution are intertwined, Gibbons and his team set about improving both. One of their first steps was to build a global map of Starbucks' transportation expenditures—no easy task, because it involved gathering all supply chain costs by region and by customer, Gibbons says. An analysis of those expenditures allowed Starbucks to winnow its transportation carriers, retaining only those that provided the best service.
The logistics team also met with its 3PLs and reviewed productivity and contract rates. To aid the review process, the team created weekly scorecards for measuring those vendors. "There are very clear service metrics, clear cost metrics, and clear productivity metrics, and those were agreed with our partners," Gibbons notes.
The scorecard assessments of a 3PL's performance were based on a very simple system, using only two numbers: 0 and 1. For example, if a vendor operating a warehouse or DC picked a product accurately, it earned a "1" for that activity. If a shipment was missing even one pallet, the 3PL received a score of "0." As part of the scorecard initiative, Starbucks also began making service data by store, delivery lane, and stock-keeping unit (SKU) available to its supply chain partners. "The scorecard and the weekly rhythm (for review of the scorecard) ensured transparency in how we were improving the cost base while maintaining a focus on looking after our people and servicing our customers," Gibbons says.
Although Starbucks has a raft of metrics for evaluating supply chain performance, it focuses on four high-level categories to create consistency and balance across the global supply chain team: safety in operations, service measured by on-time delivery and order fill rates, total end-to-end supply chain costs, and enterprise savings. This last refers to cost savings that come from areas outside logistics, such as procurement, marketing, or research and development.
In undertaking all of those steps to reduce operating costs and improve execution, Gibbons says, Starbucks was laying the foundation for future supply chain capabilities. "We tell the stores that we have got to get the fundamentals right—the things that give people confidence. ... We don't ship things that aren't right," he explains.
Earning the company's confidence
Since Starbucks began its supply chain transformation effort, it has curtailed costs worldwide without compromising service delivery. "As a company," Gibbons says, "we have talked publicly of over $500 million of savings in the last two years, and the supply chain has been a major contributor to that."
In Gibbons' eyes, the transformation effort has been a success. "Today there's a lot of confidence in our supply chain to execute every day, to make 70,000 deliveries a week, to get new products to market, and to manage product transitions, new product introductions, and promotions," he says. "There's a lot of confidence that we now are focused on service and quality to provide what our stores need and what our other business customers need."
To sustain that momentum for improvement and to ensure a future flow of talent into the organization, Starbucks recently began an initiative to recruit top graduates of supply chain education programs. (For more on this initiative, see the sidebar "Starbucks: The next generation.") Along with its recruiting program, the company plans to provide ongoing training for its existing employees to help them further develop their supply chain knowledge and skills. "We want to make sure we have thought leaders [in our supply chain organization]," Gibbons says. Starbucks considers this initiative to be so important, in fact, that Gibbons now spends 40 to 50 percent of his time on developing, hiring, and retaining supply chain talent.
The infusion of new recruits will allow Starbucks to stay focused on its supply chain mission of delivering products with a high level of service at the lowest possible cost to its stores in the United States and around the globe. As Gibbons observes, "No one is going to listen to us talking about supply chain strategy if we can't deliver service, quality, and cost on a daily basis."
Email James A. Cooke
We Want to Hear From You! We invite you to share your thoughts and opinions about this article by sending an e-mail to editor@supplychainquarterly.com . We will publish selected readers' comments in future issues of CSCMP's Supply Chain Quarterly. Correspondence may be edited for clarity or for length.

Thursday, 29 December 2011

Housing correction big risk for Canada

The Canadian housing market is at risk of a price correction and remains the chief domestic vulnerability to the country’s economy in the new year, according to two new reports.
They warn of an overvaluation of Canadian housing by 10% to 15%, aggravated by rising levels of household debt.
Entering a year laden with potential global economic shocks, Canadian authorities need to beware of housing risk as the chief domestic risk, the International Monetary Fund warned.
“Adverse macroeconomic shocks, such as a faltering global environment and declining commodity prices, could result in significant job losses, tighter lending standards, and declines in house prices, triggering a protracted period of weak private consumption as households reduce their debt,” the IMF said in its annual report on the Canadian economy.
Should the European sovereign debt crisis destabilize the global economy, triggering in Canada a 15% decline in house prices, combined with a severe downturn in construction activity “could result in a GDP decline of some 2.5% over a period of two years relative to the baseline,” the report said.
TD Economics also warns of a possible housing correction bringing prices more in line with fundamentals next year and into 2013.
Deciding the fate of the housing market will be the opposing forces of rock-bottom interest rates and economic weakness, TD economist Sonya Gulati said in a report.
“Looking ahead, we anticipate a tug-of-war action to take hold in the Canadian real estate market. At one end of the rope is the magnetism of low interest rates; at the other are subdued prospects for economic, income and employment growth.
“Ultimately, we expect the economic side of the equation to win out over the near-term,” she said.
That would mean a soft first half of the year largely as a result of external economic tensions. Even if those headwinds subside in the latter half of 2012, rising interest rates will restore the pressure on housing prices.
On average, and with great regional variation, Canadian housing prices could fall by 1.9% next year and 3.6% in 2013, Ms. Gulati said. Home sales could suffer comparable declines, while average starts should fall to 170,000 to 180,000 annually over the next two years.
“Collectively, these adjustments will gradually erase the over-valuation in the marketplace,” Ms. Gulati said.
The pace of adjustment could become decidedly less gradual if Europe fails to contain financial contagion. And if households continue to take on debt, the eventual deleveraging effect could be more pronounced.
With income growth lagging borrowing, household debt has risen to a record 150% of disposable income, a burden the Bank of Canada said represents the greatest domestic threat to economic stability.
While low interest rates continue to encourage borrowing growth, the IMF lent its support to the central bank’s accommodative rate policy.
“Should the recovery be accompanied by further sustained increases in mortgage debt as a share of disposable income spurred by low interest rates, a tightening of macroprudential policies by the government may be needed,” it said.

Monday, 19 December 2011

Discounts May Hurt Retailers' December Profits Christmas bargains are no bargain for Best Buy, apparel chains, and others

Nov. 28 may fall only once on the calendar, but Cyber Monday came twice this year at J.C. Penney (JCP) and Sears Holdings (SHLD) —once on the day after Thanksgiving weekend and again a week later. Ditto for Black Friday at New York’s J&R Electronics. And Target (TGT) on Dec. 8 began its “Almost Last Minute Sale”—even though Christmas was weeks away. These revisions to the holiday calendar, and the discounting that accompanies each tweak, show just how determined retailers are to keep the attention of consumers this Christmas season.
Typically, stores let up on the deals after Thanksgiving weekend. Yet amid worries about lingering unemployment and the health of the economy, retailers this year are continuing to roll out discounts. That’s likely to hammer profit margins, especially for merchants facing higher labor and raw material costs. To see big promotions after Black Friday “is a bit alarming,” says Poonam Goyal, a Bloomberg Industries analyst. “Investors expected margins to be down due to inflation, but they didn’t expect margins to be down from more promotions.”
Merchants are now smack in the middle of the traditional spending lull between Black Friday weekend and the final days before Christmas. This year’s interval comes after retailers posted record Black Friday weekend sales of $52.4 billion, according to the National Retail Federation. Year-over-year sales in November increased 3.2 percent, beating forecasts.
To get those results, retailers began offering holiday promotions earlier than usual. Some Black Friday deals arrived a month before the actual day, and marketing ploys such as Black Friday Week and even Black November proved popular. “It’s a crazy time right now, with retailers willing to do anything,” says David L. Bassuk, head of the global retail practice at consultant AlixPartners. He says these nonstop promotions make December profits “highly questionable” since consumers usually flock to the items on sale. Best Buy (BBY), for example, on Dec. 13 said that earnings for its fiscal third quarter (ended Nov. 26) fell 29 percent due in part to Black Friday discounting. Its stock price then plunged 15 percent.
Industrywide, store traffic in the first week of December declined 5.9 percent from a year earlier, reported ShopperTrak. If more shoppers don’t return to stores, retailers may have to cut prices more than they’d planned, squeezing margins, says Goyal. That already began happening in the third quarter. Average gross margin, or share of sales left after deducting the cost of goods sold, for 43 retailers in the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index, fell to 32.2 percent from 33.1 percent a year ago, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.
Apparel chains may be especially vulnerable because the clothes they’re selling now were purchased earlier in the year when cotton prices were at record highs. Third-quarter gross margins declined more than three percentage points at Abercrombie & Fitch (ANF), Gap (GPS), Urban Outfitters (URBN), and Chico’s FAS (CHS). And unseasonably warm weather has forced retailers to mark down winter clothing—potentially another hit to margins, says Ken Stumphauzer, a retail analyst at Sterne Agee. That only increases the need for retailers to lure more shoppers. And nothing draws them in like discounts.
The bottom line: Early discounts may reduce retailers’ profit margins, which already had fallen about 1 percentage point in the third quarter.

Retailers are linking security cameras with software to track consumer behavior

On the Web, every click and jiggle of the mouse helps e-tailers customize sites and maximize the likelihood of a purchase. Brick-and-mortar stores have long wanted to track consumers in a similar fashion, but following atoms is a lot harder than following bits. For the most part, they’ve been forced to rely on consumer surveys, says Herb Sorensen, an adviser at market research firm TNS Retail & Shopper (WPPGY) in London. “The problem with survey research is the consumer can say one thing and do another.”
To get a better understanding of their customers in real time, mall operators are monitoring shoppers’ behavior with devices that track mobile-phone signals, while retailers including Montblanc (CFRUY), T-Mobile (DTEGF), and Family Dollar Stores (FDO) are finding new uses for old tools such as in-store security cameras. The goal is to divine which variables affect a purchase, then act with Web-like nimbleness to deploy more salespeople, alter displays, or put out red blouses instead of blue. Until recently, “stores have been a black hole,” says Alexei Agratchev, chief executive officer of consultancy RetailNext. “People were convinced something was true and spending tens of millions based on that” without evidence to back it up.
Agratchev says RetailNext was founded in 2007 to change that. It helps retailers build systems to better understand customer behavior. In most cases, the company relies on the video from a store’s existing security camera system. That feed is run through RetailNext’s software, which analyzes the video and correlates it with sales data. The software can also integrate data from hardware such as radio-frequency identification (RFID) chips and motion sensors to track how often a brand of cereal is picked up or how many customers turn left when they enter a store. The company now has 40 retailer clients, including American Apparel (APP) and Family Dollar, and another 20 are testing the systems. RetailNext’s data sometimes refutes conventional wisdom. For instance, many food manufacturers pay a premium for their products to be displayed at the end of an aisle. But customers pay greater attention to products placed in the center of an aisle, according to RetailNext’s analysis.
Luxury retailer Montblanc began testing RetailNext’s video analytics at a store in Miami six months ago. Employees have used it to generate maps showing which parts of the store are best-trafficked and to decide where to place in-store decorations, salespeople, and merchandise. Rodrigo Fajardo, Montblanc’s brand manager in Miami, says RetailNext’s analysis helps his team make decisions faster. “We aren’t taking six months to make a change,” he says. “We analyze one week, and the next week we are making the changes.” He says the software has helped boost sales 20 percent and that Montblanc plans to expand its use to a dozen locations.
T-Mobile employs similar technology from San Francisco’s 3VR, a maker of security systems. Two years ago, 3VR executives realized that its cameras could be used to gather consumer data, according to the company’s CEO, Al Shipp. He says T-Mobile, in Bellevue, Wash., uses 3VR’s technology in some of its retail stores to track how people move around, how long they stand in front of displays, and which phones they pick up and for how long. T-Mobile declined to comment. Now 3VR is testing facial-recognition software that can identify shoppers’ gender and approximate age. The software would give retailers a better handle on customer demographics and help them tailor promotions, Shipp says. “You’ll have the ability someday to measure every metric imaginable. We’re scratching the surface.”
Some retailers are installing gear to track shoppers via cell phones. Path Intelligence, a company in Portsmouth, England, started selling a technology in 2009 that records a phone’s cellular signal and follows its owner through a building. Today it’s used primarily by malls in Europe, and the company says its technology records the paths of more than 1 million customers every day. Some retailers use the data to figure out where in a mall to place their stores, says Path Intelligence CEO Sharon Biggar. Others use it to find out the nationality of their visitors using the country code at the start of their phone numbers.
Shopping centers using FootPath post signs near entrances and mall maps informing shoppers that their mobile phones are being tracked and to turn off their phones if they don’t want to be monitored. But such tracking still concerns privacy advocates. David Jacobs, a fellow at the Electronic Privacy Information Center, says it’s “impractical” to suggest shoppers turn off their phones because so many people use them to meet up with friends. Path Intelligence says it doesn’t record anyone’s identity and alters some of the digits in each phone number before storing it. “We have designed this service so that it’s impossible to detect any personal information or link the number to a person,” says Biggar.
Not everyone is reassured. In November the Short Pump Town Center in Richmond, Va., and the Promenade Temecula mall in California began testing Footpath, the first such trials in the U.S. The test was suspended after one day following complaints from Senator Charles E. Schumer (D-N.Y.) that the technology could compromise shoppers’ privacy. “We would like to address the privacy concerns before moving forward,” says Julia Yuryev, a spokeswoman for Forest City Commercial Management (FCE/A), which owns both shopping centers. J.C. Penney (JCP) tested the technology in one store but has no plans to implement it, says Rebecca Winter, a spokeswoman for the chain. “The more focused you get on the shopper, the greater their risks,” says Jacobs. Mark Rasch, director of cybersecurity and privacy at CSC (CSC), a consulting firm in Falls Church, Va., says that tracking phones or using cameras to glean shopping habits is “no more intrusive than what online retailers do.”
These tools are likely to become more common if other retailers can replicate Montblanc’s success at boosting sales. “It’s really a game-changing experience, and this is only the beginning,” says brand manager Fajardo. “Before we were just working based on certain know-how and intuition. This is designing a retail business based on real statistics.”
The bottom line: Montblanc reports sales increases of 20 percent with shopper-tracking technology that raises privacy concerns.

Wednesday, 7 December 2011

The Impoverished “Asian Century”

HONG KONG – By 2050, Asia will have more than five billion people, while the European Union’s share of the global population will decline from 9% to 5%. Annual economic growth in Asia over the past 30 years has averaged 5%. Its GDP is projected to increase from $30 trillion to about $230 trillion by 2050. The balance of power in the twenty-first century is shifting – in social, economic, and, arguably, political terms – from west to east.
Western anxieties about a looming “Asian century” stem largely from the precedent of twentieth-century geopolitics, in which the West dominated less-developed nations. But this dynamic is outdated, and Asia would suffer as much as the West from any attempt to emulate the British and American empires of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
As Asian economic growth has increased, consumption in the region has also risen. Multinational companies and Western countries – both of which stand to benefit greatly from Asia’s increasing consumption – have encouraged Asians to aspire to a Western standard of living, with its high energy usage, electronic toys, and meat-heavy diet. Asian governments seem willing partners in this one-dimensional approach to development, and are eager to lead global economic growth. Yet it is neither desirable nor possible for Asians to consume in the way that Westerners do, and Asian governments should face up to this reality.
In previous centuries, Western economic growth was characterized by a comparatively insignificant minority having unfettered access to resources, and was thus built on fueling consumption. This was, after all, the idea behind colonialism, which succeeded economically by underpricing resources or even obtaining them for free.
But the planet simply cannot support five billion Asians consuming like Westerners. The earth’s regenerative capacity was exceeded more than 30 years ago, and we now use 30% more resources than the planet can sustain. Although we know this to be the case, the vast majority of Western economists and institutions continue to encourage China and India to consume more.
Asian governments must reject this trend, but, having been intellectually subservient for so long, it is not clear that they will. Western governments, for their part, must stop being intellectually dishonest. Indeed, they must openly acknowledge the impossibility of supporting demands for ever-higher material consumption in Asia without irreversibly changing our planet’s climate and resource pool. Trade relations are far less important than establishing a dialogue between the West and Asia that addresses how to live within limits.
For example, Western leaders concerned about climate change must understand that economic instruments like emissions trading are not a panacea. For Asia, resource management must be at the center of policymaking, which may include Draconian regulations, and even bans. Otherwise, resource shortages will push up commodity prices and create crises in food, water, fisheries, forests, land use, and housing, thereby leading to greater social injustice.
The West must help Asia to challenge the idea that consumption-led growth is the only solution, or even a solution at all. And Asia must adopt three core principles to avert environmental and social crises. First, economic activity must be secondary to maintaining resources. Second, Asian governments must take action to re-price resources and focus on increasing their productivity. Third, Asian states must recast their central role as being to defend our collective welfare by protecting natural capital and the environment.
All of this implies that Asian governments will need to play a far greater role than officials in Europe or America in managing both the macro-economy and personal consumption choices, which will require very sensitive political choices regarding individual rights, as well as policies that powerful business interests – many of them Western – will resist.
Asian governments will sometimes need to set strict limits on resource use – and have the tools to ensure that society respects these limits. They should begin, for example, by stressing that car ownership is not a human right. The debate about rights must emphasize constraints, not the utopian definitions of Western politicians.
These policy options fly in the face of Western liberal-democratic orthodoxy. But Western policymakers should not react negatively to these sorts of policy choices made by Asian governments, nor misconstrue them as anti-capitalist or anti-democratic. The West must realize that its consumption-led economic system has exhausted the world’s resources, and that it is not a viable option for most Asian countries, whose governments must employ different political methods to create more equitable societies.
Chandran Nair is the founder of the Global Institute For Tomorrow (GIFT) and Co-Founder and Chair of Avantage Ventures, a social investment advisory firm based in Hong Kong. He is the author of Consumptionomics: Asia’s Role in Reshaping Capitalism and Saving the Planet.

Friday, 2 December 2011

Have you tested your strategy lately?

Have you tested your strategy lately?
Ten timeless tests can help you kick the tires on your strategy, and kick up the level of strategic dialogue throughout your company.
JANUARY 2011 • Chris Bradley, Martin Hirt, and Sven Smit
Source: Strategy Practice


In This Article
Exhibit 1: Most companies’ strategies pass fewer than four of the ten tests.
Test 1: Will your strategy beat the market?
Exhibit 2: Markets drive a reversion to mean performance.
Test 2: Does your strategy tap a true source of advantage?
Test 3: Is your strategy granular about where to compete?
Test 4: Does your strategy put you ahead of trends?
Test 5: Does your strategy rest on privileged insights?
Sidebar: The insight deficit
Test 6: Does your strategy embrace uncertainty?
Test 7: Does your strategy balance commitment and flexibility?
Test 8: Is your strategy contaminated by bias?
Test 9: Is there conviction to act on your strategy?
Test 10: Have you translated your strategy into an action plan?
About the authors
Comments (18)
“What’s the next new thing in strategy?” a senior executive recently asked Phil Rosenzweig, a professor at IMD,1in Switzerland. His response was surprising for someone whose career is devoted to advancing the state of the art of strategy: “With all respect, I think that’s the wrong question. There’s always new stuff out there, and most of it’s not very good. Rather than looking for the next musing, it’s probably better to be thorough about what we know is true and make sure we do that well.”
Let’s face it: the basic principles that make for good strategy often get obscured. Sometimes the explanation is a quest for the next new thing—natural in a field that emerged through the steady accumulation of frameworks promising to unlock the secret of competitive advantage.2 In other cases, the culprit is torrents of data, reams of analysis, and piles of documents that can be more distracting than enlightening.
Ultimately, strategy is a way of thinking, not a procedural exercise or a set of frameworks. To stimulate that thinking and the dialogue that goes along with it, we developed a set of tests aimed at helping executives assess the strength of their strategies. We focused on testing the strategy itself (in other words, the output of the strategy-development process), rather than the frameworks, tools, and approaches that generate strategies, for two reasons. First, companies develop strategy in many different ways, often idiosyncratic to their organizations, people, and markets. Second, many strategies emerge over time rather than from a process of deliberate formulation.3
There are ten tests on our list, and not all are created equal. The first—“will it beat the market?”—is comprehensive. The remaining nine disaggregate the picture of a market-beating strategy, though it’s certainly possible for a strategy to succeed without “passing” all nine of them. This list may sound more complicated than the three Cs or the five forces of strategy.4But detailed pressure testing, in our experience, helps pinpoint more precisely where the strategy needs work, while generating a deeper and more fruitful strategic dialogue.
Those conversations matter, but they often are loose and disjointed. We heard that, loud and clear, over the past two years in workshops where we explored our tests with more than 700 senior strategists around the world. Furthermore, a recent McKinsey Quarterlysurvey of 2,135 executives indicates that few strategies pass more than three of the tests (Exhibit 1). In contrast, the reflections of a range of current and former strategy practitioners (see “How we do it: Strategic tests from four senior executives”) suggest that the tests described here help formalize something that the best strategists do quite intuitively.
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The tests of a good strategy are timeless in nature. But the ability to pressure-test a strategy is especially timely now. The financial crisis of 2008 and the recession that followed made some strategies obsolete, revealed weaknesses in others, and forced many companies to confront choices and trade-offs they put off in boom years. At the same time, a shift toward shorter planning cycles and decentralized strategic decision making are increasing the utility of a common set of tests.5All this makes today an ideal time to kick the tires on your strategy.
Test 1: Will your strategy beat the market?
All companies operate in markets surrounded by customers, suppliers, competitors, substitutes, and potential entrants, all seeking to advance their own positions. That process, unimpeded, inexorably drives economic surplus—the gap between the return a company earns and its cost of capital—toward zero.
For a company to beat the market by capturing and retaining an economic surplus, there must be an imperfection that stops or at least slows the working of the market. An imperfection controlled by a company is a competitive advantage. These are by definition scarce and fleeting because markets drive reversion to mean performance (Exhibit 2). The best companies are emulated by those in the middle of the pack, and the worst exit or undergo significant reform. As each player responds to and learns from the actions of others, best practice becomes commonplace rather than a market-beating strategy. Good strategies emphasize difference—versus your direct competitors, versus potential substitutes, and versus potential entrants.
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Market participants play out the drama of competition on a stage beset by randomness. Because the evolution of markets is path dependent—that is, its current state at any one time is the sum product of all previous events, including a great many random ones—the winners of today are often the accidents of history. Consider the development of the US tire industry. At its peak in the mid-1920s, a frenzy of entry had created almost 300 competitors. Yet by the 1940s, four producers controlled more than 70 percent of the market. Those winners happened to make retrospectively lucky choices about location and technology, but at the time it was difficult to tell which companies were truly fit for the evolving environment. The histories of many other industries, from aerospace to information technology, show remarkably similar patterns.
To beat the market, therefore, advantages have to be robust and responsive in the face of onrushing market forces. Few companies, in our experience, ask themselves if they are beating the market—the pressures of “just playing along” seem intense enough. But playing along can feel safer than it is. Weaker contenders win surprisingly often in war when they deploy a divergent strategy, and the same is true in business.6
Further reading:
Anita M. McGahan How Industries Evolve: Principles for Achieving and Sustaining Superior Performance, Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Publishing, 2004.
Philipp M. Natterman, “Best practice does not equal best strategy,” mckinseyquarterly.com, May 2000.
Michael Porter, “What is strategy?” Harvard Business Review, November 1996, Volume 74, Number 6, pp. 61–78.
Nassim Nicholas Taleb, Fooled by Randomness: The Hidden Role of Chance in the Markets and in Life, New York: Texere, 2001.
Test 2: Does your strategy tap a true source of advantage?
Know your competitive advantage, and you’ve answered the question of why you make money (and vice versa). Competitive advantage stems from two sources of scarcity: positional advantages and special capabilities.
Positional advantages are rooted in structurally attractive markets. By definition, such advantages favor incumbents: they create an asymmetry between those inside and those outside high walls. For example, in Australia, two beer makers control 95 percent of the market and enjoy triple the margins of US brewers. This situation has sustained itself for two decades, but it wasn’t always so. Beginning in the 1980s, the Australian industry experienced consolidation. That change in structure was associated with a change in industry conduct (price growth began outstripping general inflation) and a change in industry performance (higher profitability). Understanding the relationship among structure, conduct, and performance is a critical part of the quest for positional advantage.
Special capabilities, the second source of competitive advantage, are scarce resources whose possession confers unique benefits. The most obvious resources, such as drug patents or leases on mineral deposits, we call “privileged, tradable assets”: they can be bought and sold. A second category of special capabilities, “distinctive competencies,” consists of things a company does particularly well, such as innovating or managing stakeholders. These capabilities can be just as powerful in creating advantage but cannot be easily traded.
Too often, companies are cavalier about claiming special capabilities. Such a capability must be critical to a company’s profits and exist in abundance within it while being scarce outside. As such, special capabilities tend to be specific in nature and few in number. Companies often err here by mistaking size for scale advantage or overestimating their ability to leverage capabilities across markets. They infer special capabilities from observed performance, often without considering other explanations (such as luck or positional advantage). Companies should test any claimed capability advantage vigorously before pinning their hopes on it.
When companies bundle together activities that collectively create advantage, it becomes more difficult for competitors to identify and replicate its exact source. Consider Aldi, the highly successful discount grocery retailer. To deliver its value proposition of lower prices, Aldi has completely redesigned the typical business system of a supermarket: only 1,500 or so products rather than 30,000, the stocking of one own-brand or private label rather than hundreds of national brands, and superlean replenishment on pallets and trolleys, thus avoiding the expensive task of hand stacking shelves. Given the enormous changes necessary for any supermarket that wishes to copy the total system, it is extremely difficult to mimic Aldi’s value proposition.
Finally, don’t forget to take a dynamic view. What can erode positional advantage? Which special capabilities are becoming vulnerable? There is every reason to believe that competitors will exploit points of vulnerability. Assume, like Lewis Carroll’s Red Queen, that you have to run just to stay in the same place.
Further reading:
Patricia Gorman Clifford, Kevin P. Coyne, and Stephen J. D. Hall, “Is your core competence a mirage?” mckinseyquarterly.com, February 1997.
Michael J. Lanning and Edward G. Michaels, “Thinking strategically,” mckinseyquarterly.com, June 2000.
Michael Porter, “The five competitive forces that shape strategy,” Harvard Business Review, January 2008, Volume 86, Number 1, pp. 78–93.
Phil Rosenzweig, The Halo Effect and the Eight Other Business Delusions That Deceive Managers, New York: Free Press, 2007.
Test 3: Is your strategy granular about where to compete?
The need to beat the market begs the question of which market. Research shows that the unit of analysis used in determining strategy (essentially, the degree to which a market is segmented) significantly influences resource allocation and thus the likelihood of success: dividing the same businesses in different ways leads to strikingly different capital allocations.
What is the right level of granularity? Push within reason for the finest possible objective segmentation of the market: think 30 to 50 segments rather than the more typical 5 or so. Too often, by contrast, the business unit as defined by the organizational chart becomes the default for defining markets, reducing from the start the potential scope of strategic thinking.
Defining and understanding these segments correctly is one of the most practical things a company can do to improve its strategy. Management at one large bank attributed fast growth and share gains to measurably superior customer perceptions and satisfaction. Examining the bank’s markets at a more granular level suggested that 90 percent of its outperformance could be attributed to a relatively high exposure to one fast-growing city and to a presence in a fast-growing product segment. This insight helped the bank avoid building its strategy on false assumptions about what was and wasn’t working for the operation as a whole.
In fact, 80 percent of the variance in revenue growth is explained by choices about where to compete, according to research summarized in The Granularity of Growth, leaving only 20 percent explained by choices about how to compete. Unfortunately, this is the exact opposite of the allocation of time and effort in a typical strategy-development process. Companies should be shifting their attention greatly toward the “where” and should strive to outposition competitors by regularly reallocating resources as opportunities shift within and between segments.
Further reading:
Mehrdad Baghai, Sven Smit, and Patrick Viguerie, The Granularity of Growth: How to Identify the Sources of Growth and Drive Enduring Company Performance, Hoboken, NJ: Wiley & Sons, 2008.
Mehrdad Baghai, Sven Smit, and Patrick Viguerie, “Is your growth strategy flying blind?” Harvard Business Review, May 2009, Volume 87, Number 5, pp. 86–96.
Stefano Proverbio, Sven Smit, and S. Patrick Viguerie, “Dissecting global trends: An example from Italy,” mckinseyquarterly.com, March 2008.
Test 4: Does your strategy put you ahead of trends?
The emergence of new trends is the norm. But many strategies place too much weight on the continuation of the status quo because they extrapolate from the past three to five years, a time frame too brief to capture the true violence of market forces.
A major innovation or an external shock in regulation, demand, or technology, for example, can drive a rapid, full-scale industry transition. But most trends emerge fairly slowly—so slowly that companies generally fail to respond until a trend hits profits. At this point, it is too late to mount a strategically effective response, let alone shape the change to your advantage. Managers typically delay action, held back by sunk costs, an unwillingness to cannibalize a legacy business, or an attachment to yesterday’s formula for success. The cost of delay is steep: consider the plight of major travel agency chains slow to understand the power of online intermediaries. Conversely, for companies that get ahead of the curve, major market transitions are an opportunity to rethink their commitments in areas ranging from technology to distribution and to tailor their strategies to the new environment.
To do so, strategists must take trend analysis seriously. Always look to the edges. How are early adopters and that small cadre of consumers who seem to be ahead of the curve acting? What are small, innovative entrants doing? What technologies under development could change the game? To see which trends really matter, assess their potential impact on the financial position of your company and articulate the decisions you would make differently if that outcome were certain. For example, don’t just stop at an aging population as a trend—work it through to its conclusion. Which consumer behaviors would change? Which particular product lines would be affected? What would be the precise effect on the P&L? And how does that picture line up with today’s investment priorities?
Further reading:
Filipe Barbosa, Damian Hattingh, and Michael Kloss, “Applying global trends: A look at China’s auto industry,” mckinseyquarterly.com, July 2010.
Peter Bisson, Elizabeth Stephenson, and S. Patrick Viguerie, “Global forces: An introduction,” mckinseyquarterly.com, June 2010.
William I. Huyett and S. Patrick Viguerie, “Extreme competition,” mckinseyquarterly.com, February 2005.
Richard Rumelt, “Strategy in a ‘structural break,’” mckinseyquarterly.com, December 2008.
Test 5: Does your strategy rest on privileged insights?
Data today can be cheap, accessible, and easily assembled into detailed analyses that leave executives with the comfortable feeling of possessing an informed strategy. But much of this is noise and most of it is widely available to rivals. Furthermore, routinely analyzing readily available data diverts attention from where insight-creating advantage lies: in the weak signals buried in the noise.
In the 1990s, when the ability to burn music onto CDs emerged, no one knew how digitization would play out; MP3s, peer-to-peer file sharing, and streaming Web-based media were not on the horizon. But one corporation with a large record label recognized more rapidly than others that the practical advantage of copyright protection could quickly become diluted if consumers began copying material. Early recognition of that possibility allowed the CEO to sell the business at a multiple based on everyone else’s assumption that the status quo was unthreatened.
 
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  The insight deficit
A fresh strategic insight—something your company sees that no one else does—is one of the foundations of competitive advantage. It helps companies focus their resources on moves that separate them from the pack. That makes the following interesting: in a recent survey, only 35% of 2,135 global executives believed their strategies rested on unique and powerful insights. That figure was dramatically lower than the average—62 percent—for nine other tests we asked executives to measure their strategies against.
What’s more, only 14 percent of surveyed executives placed novel insights among the top three strategic influencers of financial performance. One likely explanation: the widespread availability of information and adoption of sophisticated strategy frameworks creates an impression that “everyone knows what we know and is probably analyzing the data in the same ways that we are.” The danger is obvious: if strategists question their ability to generate novel insights, they are less likely to reach for the relative advantages that are most likely to differentiate them from competitors.
For the complete survey results, see “Putting strategies to the test: McKinsey Global Survey results.” 
     
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Developing proprietary insights isn’t easy. In fact, this is the element of good strategy where most companies stumble (see sidebar, “The insight deficit”). A search for problems can help you get started. Create a short list of questions whose answers would have major implications for the company’s strategy—for example, “What will we regret doing if the development of India hiccups or stalls, and what will we not regret?” In doing so, don’t forget to examine the assumptions, explicit and implicit, behind an established business model. Do they still fit the current environment?
Another key is to collect new data through field observations or research rather than to recycle the same industry reports everyone else uses. Similarly, seeking novel ways to analyze the data can generate powerful new insights. For example, one supermarket chain we know recently rethought its store network strategy on the basis of surprising results from a new clustering algorithm.
Finally, many strategic breakthroughs have their root in a simple but profound customer insight (usually solving an old problem for the customer in a new way). In our experience, companies that go out of their way to experience the world from the customer’s perspective routinely develop better strategies.
Further reading:
Patricia Gorman Clifford, Kevin P. Coyne, and Renée Dye, “Breakthrough thinking from inside the box,” Harvard Business Review, December 2007, Volume 85, Number 12, pp. 70–78.
John E. Forsyth, Nicolo’ Galante, and Todd Guild, “Capitalizing on customer insights,” mckinseyquarterly.com, August 2006.
Test 6: Does your strategy embrace uncertainty?
A central challenge of strategy is that we have to make choices now, but the payoffs occur in a future environment we cannot fully know or control. A critical step in embracing uncertainty is to try to characterize exactly what variety of it you face—a surprisingly rare activity at many companies. Our work over the years has emphasized four levels of uncertainty. Level one offers a reasonably clear view of the future: a range of outcomes tight enough to support a firm decision. At level two, there are a number of identifiable outcomes for which a company should prepare. At level three, the possible outcomes are represented not by a set of points but by a range that can be understood as a probability distribution. Level four features total ambiguity, where even the distribution of outcomes is unknown.
In our experience, companies oscillate between assuming, simplistically, that they are operating at level one (and making bold but unjustified point forecasts) and succumbing to an unnecessarily pessimistic level-four paralysis. In each case, careful analysis of the situation usually redistributes the variables into the middle ground of levels two and three.
Rigorously understanding the uncertainty you face starts with listing the variables that would influence a strategic decision and prioritizing them according to their impact. Focus early analysis on removing as much uncertainty as you can—by, for example, ruling out impossible outcomes and using the underlying economics at work to highlight outcomes that are either mutually reinforcing or unlikely because they would undermine one another in the market. Then apply tools such as scenario analysis to the remaining, irreducible uncertainty, which should be at the heart of your strategy.
Further reading:
Hugh G. Courtney, 20/20 Foresight: Crafting Strategy in an Uncertain World, Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Publishing, 2001.
Hugh G. Courtney, Jane Kirkland, and S. Patrick Viguerie, “Strategy under uncertainty,” mckinseyquarterly.com, June 2000.
Charles Roxburgh, “The use and abuse of scenarios,” mckinseyquarterly.com, November 2009.
Test 7: Does your strategy balance commitment and flexibility?
Commitment and flexibility exist in inverse proportion to each other: the greater the commitment you make, the less flexibility remains. This tension is one of the core challenges of strategy. Indeed, strategy can be expressed as making the right trade-offs over time between commitment and flexibility.
Making such trade-offs effectively requires an understanding of which decisions involve commitment. Inside any large company, hundreds of people make thousands of decisions each year. Only a few are strategic: those that involve commitment through hard-to-reverse investments in long-lasting, company-specific assets. Commitment is the only path to sustainable competitive advantage.
In a world of uncertainty, strategy is about not just where and how to compete but also when. Committing too early can be a leap in the dark. Being too late is also dangerous, either because opportunities are perishable or rivals can seize advantage while your company stands on the sidelines. Flexibility is the essential ingredient that allows companies to make commitments when the risk/return trade-off seems most advantageous.
A market-beating strategy will focus on just a few crucial, high-commitment choices to be made now, while leaving flexibility for other such choices to be made over time. In practice, this approach means building your strategy as a portfolio comprising three things: big bets, or committed positions aimed at gaining significant competitive advantage; no-regrets moves, which will pay off whatever happens; and real options, or actions that involve relatively low costs now but can be elevated to a higher level of commitment as changing conditions warrant. You can build underpriced options into a strategy by, for example, modularizing major capital projects or maintaining the flexibility to switch between different inputs.
Further reading:
Lowell L. Bryan, “Just-in-time strategy for a turbulent world,” mckinseyquarterly.com, June 2002.
Keith J. Leslie and Max P. Michaels, “The real power of real options,” mckinseyquarterly.com, June 2000.
Test 8: Is your strategy contaminated by bias?
It’s possible to believe honestly that you have a market-beating strategy when, in fact, you don’t. Sometimes, that’s because forces beyond your control change. But in other cases, the cause is unintentional fuzzy thinking.
Behavioral economists have identified many characteristics of the brain that are often strengths in our broader, personal environment but that can work against us in the world of business decision making. The worst offenders include overoptimism (our tendency to hope for the best and believe too much in our own forecasts and abilities), anchoring (tying our valuation of something to an arbitrary reference point), loss aversion (putting too much emphasis on avoiding downsides and so eschewing risks worth taking), the confirmation bias (overweighting information that validates our opinions), herding (taking comfort in following the crowd), and the champion bias (assigning to an idea merit that’s based on the person proposing it).
Strategy is especially prone to faulty logic because it relies on extrapolating ways to win in the future from a complex set of factors observed today. This is fertile ground for two big inference problems: attribution error (succumbing to the “halo effect”) and survivorship bias (ignoring the “graveyard of silent failures”). Attribution error is the false attribution of success to observed factors; it is strategy by hindsight and assumes that replicating the actions of another company will lead to similar results. Survivorship bias refers to an analysis based on a surviving population, without consideration of those who did not live to tell their tale: this approach skews our view of what caused success and presents no insights into what might cause failure—were the survivors just luckier? Case studies have their place, but hindsight is in reality not 20/20. There are too many unseen factors.
Developing multiple hypotheses and potential solutions to choose among is one way to “de-bias” decision making. Too often, the typical drill is to develop a promising hypothesis and put a lot of effort into building a fact base to validate it. In contrast, it is critical to bring fresh eyes to the issues and to maintain a culture of challenge, in which the obligation to dissent is fostered.
The decision-making process can also be de-biased by, for example, specifying objective decision criteria in advance and examining the possibility of being wrong. Techniques such as the “premortem assessment” (imagining yourself in a future where your decision turns out to have been mistaken and identifying why that might have been so) can also be useful.
Further reading:
Dan Ariely, Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions, New York: HarperCollins, 2008.
Dan Lovallo and Olivier Sibony, “The case for behavioral strategy,” mckinseyquarterly.com, March 2010.
“Strategic decisions: When can you trust your gut?” mckinseyquarterly.com, March 2010.
Charles Roxburgh, “Hidden flaws in strategy,” mckinseyquarterly.com, May 2003.
Test 9: Is there conviction to act on your strategy?
This test and the one that follows aren’t strictly about the strategy itself but about the investment you’ve made in implementing it—a distinction that in our experience quickly becomes meaningless because the two, inevitably, become intertwined. Many good strategies fall short in implementation because of an absence of conviction in the organization, particularly among the top team, where just one or two nonbelievers can strangle strategic change at birth.
Where a change of strategy is needed, that is usually because changes in the external environment have rendered obsolete the assumptions underlying a company’s earlier strategy. To move ahead with implementation, you need a process that openly questions the old assumptions and allows managers to develop a new set of beliefs in tune with the new situation. This goal is not likely to be achieved just via lengthy reports and presentations. Nor will the social processes required to absorb new beliefs—group formation, building shared meaning, exposing and reconciling differences, aligning and accepting accountability—occur in formal meetings.
CEOs and boards should not be fooled by the warm glow they feel after a nice presentation by management. They must make sure that the whole team actually shares the new beliefs that support the strategy. This requirement means taking decision makers on a journey of discovery by creating experiences that will help them viscerally grasp mismatches that may exist between what the new strategy requires and the actions and behavior that have brought them success for many years. For example, visit plants and customers or tour a country your company plans to enter, so that the leadership team can personally meet crucial stakeholders. Mock-ups, video clips, and virtual experiences also can help.
The result of such an effort should be a support base of influencers who feel connected to the strategy and may even become evangelists for it. Because strategy often emanates from the top, and CEOs are accustomed to being heeded, this commonsense step often gets overlooked, to the great detriment of the strategy.
Further reading:
Derek Dean, “A CEO’s guide to reenergizing the senior team,” mckinseyquarterly.com, September 2009.
Erika Herb, Keith Leslie, and Colin Price, “Teamwork at the top,” mckinseyquarterly.com, May 2001.
Test 10: Have you translated your strategy into an action plan?
In implementing any new strategy, it’s imperative to define clearly what you are moving from and where you are moving to with respect to your company’s business model, organization, and capabilities. Develop a detailed view of the shifts required to make the move, and ensure that processes and mechanisms, for which individual executives must be accountable, are in place to effect the changes. Quite simply, this is an action plan. Everyone needs to know what to do. Be sure that each major “from–to shift” is matched with the energy to make it happen. And since the totality of the change often represents a major organizational transformation, make sure you and your senior team are drawing on the large body of research and experience offering solid advice on change management—a topic beyond the scope of this article!
Finally, don’t forget to make sure your ongoing resource allocation processes are aligned with your strategy. If you want to know what it actually is, look where the best people and the most generous budgets are—and be prepared to change these things significantly. Effort spent aligning the budget with the strategy will pay off many times over.
Further reading:
Carolyn Aiken and Scott Keller, “The irrational side of change management,” mckinseyquarterly.com, April 2009.
Mahmut Akten, Massimo Giordano, and Mari A. Scheiffele, “Just-in-time budgeting for a volatile economy,” mckinseyquarterly.com, May 2009.
Josep Isern and Caroline Pung, “Driving radical change,” mckinseyquarterly.com, November 2007.
As we’ve discussed the tests with hundreds of senior executives at many of the world’s largest companies, we’ve come away convinced that a lot of these topics are part of the strategic dialogue in organizations. But we’ve also heard time and again that discussion of such issues is often, as one executive in Japan recently told us, “random, simultaneous, and extremely confusing.” Our hope is that the tests will prove a simple and effective antidote: a means of quickly identifying gaps in executives’ strategic thinking, opening their minds toward new ways of using strategy to create value, and improving the quality of the strategy-development process itself.